Famous Battles of the 12th Marines, RVN, 1965-69

Battles of the USMC Artillery Association

Personal Accounts and Remembrances...

Many battles were fought throughout the course of the Vietnam War; Some remain in the forefront of public memory due to past and present media coverage. The bulk of battles remain lost, living within those souls who fought the terrible encounters; some for a day, others for a day and night, yet others for months. This web page is dedicated to the men of the United States Marine Corps Artillery Association who fought with ferocity and courage unknown to most, unseen by others, unheard by the masses because... A nation refused to listen. Now, they speak and tell their stories...

BattleYearBattery  Story

1. LZ Cates  1969Golf & Hotel 3/12   Partial information below

Golf 3-12 66-67, Hotel 3-12 late 68 on LZ Cates. You can get lots of stories about the Battle at Cam Lo that Golf, Hotel, and Headquarters Batteries fought. I know there were 6 KIA's, about 25 WIA's, and at least 2 Navy Crosses were awarded 26 August 1966. Golf Battery I consider the best in Vietnam but that is a little one sided. I know 2-12 and 1-12 were as good as it gets over there; maybe we should just say the 12th Marines kicked butt!

Semper Fi,

Dan Post - Email: postd_j@yahoo.com

Attack on Cam Lo...

The battle for Cam Lo and it’s artillery batteries started actually about a week before . Hotel and Golf Batteries had positions on the south side of Route 9 at Cam Lo village. It wasn’t a great position looking back because the village provided a lot of cover and concealment to any attacking NVA from the north and northwest. Additionally as 2/4 moved northwesterly the guns were put to their maximum ranges. To provide coverage’s.

Hotel and Golf were given a 155 towed howitzer to help get better artillery coverage. A platoon of tanks were also used as artillery to supplement the 105’s. On about the 17th of August  Golf and Hotel batteries moved forward, to the west along Route 9. We set up on a small ridgeline that ran from northeast to southwest. Route 9 was carved through it. Golf was the easterly battery with the 155 of theirs right into the ridge. Sergeant Troester, who was section chief of gun 4 also was the 155 crew chief. Guns 3-6 of Golf had parapets carved out of the ridge and we started building the ammo bunkers to our rears. We had tangle foot wire and a triple row of concertina in front of our guns, but the company of grunts supplemented our lines from Golf’s 155 gun around southerly to the southwest to tie back into the battery lines at Hotel battery. There were 2 tanks ,a tank retriever  inside the lines to our left rear. Headquarters Battery joined us on August 25th, bringing mess tents and living quarter tents, so there were a lot of new tents inside or lines. What made this interesting was the gun watch guys for Golf and I think Hotel were also watching lines to their fronts. I’m sure we had LP’s out front but didn’t know where. We had long days of shooting, building ammo bunkers and short nights shooting H and I’s along with the normal fire missions.

Motor T section was used on the lines to help line coverage and I think 1 guy from each gun had to go to the 155 gun to create another crew. I don’t know if this is the right place for this but in August 66 Marines along Route 9, and north of it were pretty gung-ho. There was no antiwar sentiments that I recall.  Gun 4 had Corporal Lonergan, Lance Corporal Jones, our driver, JJ Casadena, Private Botts, myself Stump, and I think Butler. JJ and Butler were new to Nam, Jonesy was a good guy from Alabama. Lonergan was from southern Illinois and was going home in another month.  I had a small reel to reel tape player that I would tape stuff home and friends “from the world” would send me tapes of songs. It was at this location I got a tape with 2 very weird songs that made everyone think the world was going nuts. Those 2 songs, “They’re coming to take me away Ha Ha” and “Yellow Submarine” by the Beatles. So during work parties I always had 1 of those 2 songs playing.

We had a couple of gooks from the village that would come in and give haircuts. This would proof fatal to them on the 26th. On the 25th both 155’s moved forward approximately 2 clicks west to provide better coverage on the reverse slopes the Razorback. The day of the 25th was like most building ammo bunker, shooting and filling sandbags. The mess tents were set up and Alpha 1-4 came into the lines to take over. The evening bought all of us mail call and hot chow. As I stood inline for chow, with Rhorbach, I looked back and there was Lynwood Inman. Lyn had dated a girl that was a friend with a girl I had dated in high school. I think I screamed out his name. We talked about home and I had received 6 newspapers from home that day and I gave him 3 papers and I kept 3 so we could switch the next day.

That night Gun 4 shot H and I’s. I took gun watch from 1am until 3am; after finishing my watch, I got my replacement up making sure he was awake. I had been thinking a long time had passed since I “aired” out my feet. When  I arrived at my tent, I went to my rack, took off my pants and boots; this was something I would never do again at night in the Nam. It seemed like I had just laid down when all of a sudden explosions went off behind our tent. I could see a red star cluster and then a large explosion sent the tank retriever into a ball of flames. It seemed all hell had broken loose in a matter of seconds...

The crews for Guns 3 and 4 were sharing a tent; after the explosions, it was chaotic getting out. Everyone was trying to get through the entrance at once; as both crews ran for the guns, we realized nobody had grabbed their M-14’s; I turned around and ran towards our tent. As I made my way back, there now seemed to be rifle fire everywhere. I knew they were inside the wire; arriving at our tent, I grabbed all the rifles, all the web gear I could find, and ran out of the tent towards Gun 4. I wasn't five feet out the door when an automatic weapon started firing at me; I hit the deck and tried to cover my head with rifles. No shit, I was scared...

It seemed like 5 minutes passed but I know it was more like 30 seconds when  suddenly, there was an explosion where the rifle fire was coming from. I jumped up and ran to the gun; Jonesy was a-gunning, Lonergan was gunning, JJ and Botts were loading. I moved to the parapet wall, covering our front.

Rifles were given out to everyone; as I remember, Jonesy and Lonergan’s were hanging on the shields of the 105.  I started seeing green tracers coming from below our gun being fired towards our front. I started firing back, trying to stop anything from coming our way. As the battle progressed the CO stopped at our gun, asking what I was shooting at. Almost immediately a green tracer passed through our position, I think he said to continue and cover our front.

We had “Puff” come on station; he started blasting away at the Gook positrons. All those red lines from the air to ground, then the buzz of bullets impacting. Everything seemed like slow motion, but it wasn’t. We kept firing the 05 till we were out of ammo, as daylight started the jets came in and started laying bombing runs to our rear. They continued all the way up the hills to the south west while the gooks tried to escape. 

The enemy firing started dying out; we began carrying ammunition for the gun from the ammo dump. I know I had a rifle over one shoulder and an 05 round over the other. H-34’s started bringing in ammo for the grunts and taking wounded out; it was pretty light out when the last jet dumped his load on the gooks and made a pass over us, wagging his wings. Everyone just started policing ammo tubes, getting ready for another attack, trying to make sense of the mess around us.

The mess tents were also "home" to the cooks; they were blown and burned. I think 3 cooks or mess duty Marines died there. Corporal Clark from Golf Battery had been on mess duty and was never the same again. He was a good Marine but the war that night had taken a heavy toll on him. I can’t recall how many wounded came from those tents but I believe Clark was the only one not wounded or killed. 

The Gooks lay dead in weird positions; I recall one NVA soldier was running, then suddenly his midsection was missing and his chest and head lay about 10 feet away from his legs; bullets had hit the explosives on his hips. Everyone started dragging dead NVA to an area where a bulldozer was digging a mass grave; we started throwing them in.  The final count was 80 inside our lines; lord knows how many were outside.

All the North Vietnamese had tied strings to their pressure points; if they were shot and still capable, the Gooks would stop, tighten the string to stop bleeding and continue on. Were they taking opium? Who knows but usually a rifle wound would take anyone to the ground. Maybe the weirdest I saw was an NVA soldier who had been shot through the head; he had stopped to bandage his wound when someone had finalized his days on earth with a few more rounds to his body.

The Golf Battery Marines on watch that night had more than 11 dead in front of their fighting hole, and more behind them and in the hole with them. I know PFC Blain was with Lance Corporal Kowalyk; it may have been Bell or Mcrae, but all 3 were wounded, Kowalyk the worst, but he had stopped the NVA from entering the back of their hole killing 1 as he tried to get to the other Marines. It was interesting because over the last few nights, Blain, and others in that position had seen and heard movement to their front. They had tossed grenades, but found nothing in the morning. That night the new LT. had told the holes “if you throw a grenade you’d better have a body out there in the morning”. I recall Blain yelling “there’s a gook, there’s a gook , you want a body I’ve got bodies”.

An 8 year old boy had been induced to attack with these NVA soldiers, they even gave him a wooden rifle with a selector. He died charging across our compound as did the “barbers“.

Golf Battery had 7 wounded: Blain, Kowalyk, Hite, Mcrae, Bell, Schlacter, and Lieutenant Westfall.  I believe Kowalyk was awarded the Navy Cross. It was a long time before he recovered from his wounds;  I also believe Lieutenant Westfall received the Bronze Star for his actions.

My buddy Inman from A-1/4 received the Silver Star or Navy Cross, a Purple Heart and a trip home. I wouldn’t see him again till 11-10-1985 when we went for a Marine Corp Birthday party and spent the whole night trying to recall 8-26-66 and the horror of that night. Hotel Battery had 3 killed in action as did Headquarters Battery. Wounded from Hotel was 6, and  4 from Headquarters. S-2 was reduced to 1 person because of the losses.

The next night at about 11:00pm we started receiving small arms fire again but nothing more happened. During the morning hours of the 28th, the hole manned by the grunts right beside Golf’s Gun 4 had an incoming grenade and 1 additional WIA. I was on gun watch at the time and immediately went forward to the parapet wall but nothing more happened that night. I’ve often wondered about the 26th after reading the after action reports and journal entries, why no one gave us notice the LP’s had movement and contact was assured. Then, on the 28th, why that grenade wasn’t thrown 10 foot left of that hole. It would have been me in a big gun pit trying to escape the outcome. 

Semper Fi,

Dan "Stumpy" Post - Email: postd_j@yahoo.com

Jim Pickett - Email: jpickett4309@yahoo.com

Please send more information about the battles at LZ Cates...

2. LZ Argon       1969     Partial information below

I was a CH-46A pilot that was called twice on March 21, 1969 for emergency medivac duty. My helicopter pulled at least 12-18 Marines out of LZ Argon that day. A lot of mortar and other ground fire nearly killed all aboard as muzzle flashes and nearby mortar shrapnel was everywhere in the Zone. Luck to be alive and happy to have saved whomever that day from a definite s---sandwich. (More information needed!)

Jim Berg - CH 46A pilot Email: jim@MatsonCreative.com

Please send more information about the battles at LZ Argon...

3. LZ Russell    1969Hotel 3/12 Information Below

At FSB Russell North Vietnamese soldiers breached perimeter defenses and attacked Hotel 3/12, assaulting three gun pits, damaging two howitzers.  After a brief period, Hotel Battery Marines re-grouped, counter attacked and re-captured their gun pits from the North Vietnamese. 

It was a chaotic battle as North Vietnamese sappers had penetrated the FSB defenses. A total of 25 Communist soldiers were found dead inside the perimeter. Hotel Battery suffered 8 KIA and 25 WIA at FSB Russell.

A Personal Account:

Ken Heins-Hotel 3/12

To the best of my recollection, on February 24, 1969, at approximately 2330 hours, we got a fire mission to fire support for Golf Battery, on LZ Neville, who had NVA in the wire.  We fired until approximately 0300 on February 25, 1969 and got a temporary end of mission.  At that time, some of the guys went back to their bunkers to rest.  I don't know when, but at around this time someone had a radio playing.  I don't know if it was live or a tape, but the song, Crimson and Clover, by Tommy James and the Shondells, was playing.  This is the last song I remember before the shit hit the fan.  To this day when I hear this song, I always wonder if I will get to hear the end of it.

I was on phone watch or restocking the ammo bunker on Gun 6, I'm not sure which, when we started getting mortared (approximately 0330, or 0400).  At first, I thought the grunts were shooting off their 81 mortars.

The NVA had their tubes set up so close to the hill that you could see the flash when the rounds came out of their mortars; they were either shooting in the wire or we were getting short rounds.  The rounds started hitting between the gun pits and the wire on the east side of the hill somewhere between guns 4 and 6.  There was a lot of confusion for the first few minutes.  Some people were running around yelling "short rounds"; others were yelling "incoming".   It took a while for the word to come down we were being mortared by NVA units. 

I was in charge of the M60; I ran for the  machine gun position.  At this time, mortars were coming in quite heavily; people were yelling to get into our bunkers.  When I reached the M60 position, two mortars hit close by; shrapnel went whizzing around me.  I could still hear people screaming "get into the bunkers," so I turned around and ran to our location, which was already occupied by three other guys.  About the same time I arrived in the bunker we could hear NVA soldiers screaming and yelling (they were attacking under their own mortar fire!)  Believing we didn't have any rifles in the bunker with us we felt helpless (I knew mine was inside the ammo bunker).  

About this time one of the guys decided to get out of the bunker so he ran out the door.  He had no more got out and North Vietnamese soldiers blew the door right off of the side of the bunker.  What I believe to be an NVA officer was standing on top of our bunker; because he could be heard very clearly, shouting what seemed to be orders.  I remember numerous loud explosions and powder flashes from exploding munitions at the doorway.  I climbed under one of the bunks for more protection from satchel charges, or fragmentation grenades, whatever they were throwing in on us.  That's the last thing I remember.  I was knocked unconscious because of the explosions. 

I do not remember anything until the CO, or XO, whatever his title was that morning, was shouting inside the bunker, asking if anyone was in there.  I yelled back, climbing out to find the front wall completely blown out and one side entirely gone.  The roof was caved in and I had a small crawl space to get out; it was already daylight by this time. 

The degree of damage to the bottom three-gun positions was catastrophic.  Two of the guns were so badly damaged they had to be removed from the hill.  Most of the bunkers were completely demolished; I remember going up to the top of the LZ in a daze, helping the wounded and loading dead on to the helicopters.  Lance Corporal Lewis, who was the A-Chief on Gun 6 (the one I was assigned to), was lying on the LZ with massive wounds, screaming in pain. I was helping the corpsman with him when Lewis died.  He had been in the bunker below the M60 (the bunker I was trying to get to). Maybe if I could have stayed with the M60 and tried to hold off the attack long enough to get him out of that bunker he might still have been alive or, on the other hand, I may have been as dead as he was.  Out of approximately 60 men that were in Hotel Battery, we had eight KIA and approximately 25-30 wounded.  As I remember there were only about 12 of us left to operate the three upper guns. 

At this time, I was reassigned to Gun 3.  I'm not sure how many guys there were left in our fire directional control center and our command.  I have documentation that there was approximately 200 NVA from the 27th NVA Regiment that overran us.  At some time around 0415 all communications with LZ Russell were lost and the order was given to fire direct fire on our position because of fear that our guns would be used against the Rockpile and Vandergrift Combat Base (other Marine Corp installations.)  From unclassified combat action reports, I have discovered there were approximately 714 high explosive rounds from four different battery's (105mm and 155mm Howitzers and 8-inch guns) fired in support of LZ Russell in the early morning hours of February 25, 1969.  Most of the bunkers on the lower part of the hill (Gun positions 4, 5 and 6) were destroyed including the Fire Directional Control bunker on the top of the hill.  It is my belief that some of these bunkers were hit by friendly fire, because of the extensive damage they sustained.  The rest of the day, we mostly had helicopters bringing in troops, reinforcement personnel for the Battery, for the grunt units and ammunition for us and the mortar companies.   At 2000 hours on February 25, 1969, we again had incoming mortar rounds and movement on the lines and another 92 rounds were fired in direct support of our position. 

After February 25, 1969, we began the long process of rebuilding the hill by building more personnel bunkers, new larger main ammo bunkers, rebuilding all the gun pits, new FDC, etc.  During the spring and summer of 1969, we were called upon to fire support for grunt units operating near the DMZ and LZ Russell; during this time, most of us were exhausted beyond belief.  Not only were we staying up all hours of the night firing rounds, but also restocking ammo bunkers during the day along with trying to rebuild the position after we were overrun.

Ken Heins, Hotel 3/12

A Second Account:

Bobby Daniels-Hotel 3/12

Around 0100, or 0200 on the morning of 25 February, 1969 we received a fire mission that LZ Neville was being overrun and all the guns were being fired in their support. I assisted in Gun one’s parapet during the fire mission. The firing went on and on… I don’t know how long it lasted. My recollection is that there was a pause in the firing and we were just waiting for a period of time. My next memory is we started getting incoming. From then on, my memory is bits and pieces. I know I tried to crawl back to the hooch and find a helmet, flack jacket, or another weapon as I was only carrying a .45. Explosions were all around us and my eardrums were ringing constantly. Later, I was crawling with someone else (I believe it was Newman) and trying to find cover.  There was an extremely loud explosion, which I later learned was a mortar that hit close by.  I remember rolling along the ground; I guess it was from the concussion of the incoming mortar.  After that I couldn't hear anything for awhile.  Then people were screaming and yelling and crying.  I remember hearing the gooks talking and I had the sense that they were all around me, everywhere.

I crawled behind a parapet wall and rolled over on my back.  My butt started burning and I realized I was wounded.  I lay on my stomach with my .45 in my hand, hearing the gooks talking.  When I looked in the sky, I saw "Puff the Magic Dragon" dropping illumination rounds.  Snoopy was firing in our support and after each loud roaring noise, I could see wavy red lines from the chopper to the ground.  I remember thinking Snoopy would fix everything.  I could see the gooks running around everywhere, talking and shouting.  As I was looking around trying to figure out what to do next, I saw a gook aiming at me with his rifle; it seemed like he was aiming at me for hours.  It was almost like slow motion as I brought my .45 around and fired… I don't know what happened next.  I'm sure I must have hit him, I just don't know.

It started getting daylight and I saw a 50 Caliber Machine Gun on the top of a hooch below us.  I remember thinking I needed to get to it, but every time I tried to climb over the wall, someone started shooting.  Some came up to me, maybe a corpsman, and said I had "all kind of meat coming out of my ass".  He dressed the wound and when I told him I was trying to get to the machine gun, he said, "I'll get the sonofabitch for you"…. And he did!  Another guy asked me if I knew how to shoot a 105.  I told him I did, but we could not get it to work properly.   Then he told me he was going to put the 50-Cal on top of a bunker and wanted me to shoot from here, to here, until he told me to stop.  And I did.  I was carried to the machine gun and someone brought me boxes of ammo.  I kept shooting the gun exactly where he told me to.  It was hard to see anything as it was still dark and smoke was everywhere.  He eventually came back and told me to stop firing.  I remember the gun was so hot, it fired four or five rounds even after I stopped.

The next thing I remember is being put on a medivac chopper and going to Da Nang.  As we left the hill, I remember the chopper was full of pain;  people were crying and screaming.  I was only eighteen years old and I didn't understand why all this was happening… it seemed like a bad dream.  When I got to Da Nang, a chaplain came and asked if there was anything he could do.  I gave him a headspace gauge for a 50-Caliber Machine Gun and told him to be sure to get it back to my unit.  He said, "Son, you've got a lot more to worry about now, other than getting this tool back to your unit".  I started crying and told him he didn't understand how important this was.  It was the only gauge my unit had and he said he would take care of it.

The chaplain went around talking to other wounded Marines, while poncho liners were being pulled over heads of those who had died.  The doctor told me I was being sent to Japan and I was glad to be leaving such a God-Forsaken place.  I was carried onto a C-141 Medivac bird and flown to Japan, where I was put on a helicopter and flown to the hospital.  The pilot asked me if I wanted to see a little bit of Japan from the air and I told him I did.  He banked the chopper so that I could see out of the window.  The snow on the mountains was beautiful… quite a contrast to a few days before where all I could see was blood and smoke and death.

At the hospital in Japan, as I was being pushed to the operating room, a doctor bent over me and told me he was also from Georgia and I was going home.  I heard someone say, "He's got blood in his urine," and someone else say, "He has shrapnel close to his kidney.  Take him back to X-ray".  One nurse told me she was "from Georgia and everything was going to be okay".  I was in the hospital for three months; I visited Newman, (I think that was who he was), who had lost both his legs.  We talked and cried over why all this was happening.  I remember lying in the hospital bed on my stomach at night with silent tears coming down my face, as I did not want to wake the others in the ward.  During the time I was in the hospital, someone called my Mother and told her I had been killed.  She thought I was dead until she got a letter from me.  There were some good times in the hospital, mainly getting to know some of the staff.  I got to be friends with two corpsmen and went on liberty with them when I got better.

After my recuperation, I was sent back to Vietnam to Golf Battery, 3/12.  I raised hell because I wanted to go back to Hotel Battery and within a few hours, I was there.  I returned to LZ Russell where things looked very different because the Seabees were concreting the parapets.  After a short time, I contracted Malaria and had to go to Da Nang for treatment.  I stayed there approximately a month then, I returned to LZ Russell, where I worked in the XO pit at night.  My job was to wake the XO officer when a fire mission came in.

These are the main things I can remember.  Everything may not be in the exact order, but this is my best recollection.

Bobby Daniels, Hotel 3/12

4.LZ Torch1968Charlie 1/12     Information Below

At LZ Torch an estimated two  companies of North Vietnamese regulars led by Sappers attacked Charlie 1/12's field position; the battery was deployed as part of new "field tactics" implemented by General Ray Davis, CG of the 3rd Marine Division. When deployed in support of 1/4, Charlie Battery was only allowed 70 Marines in the field; a normal 105 battery carries up to 120 Marines. Lieutenant Brown, Charlie's commanding officer,  made "tough choices" in selecting his field Marines but was left a group with virtually no combat experience to choose from.

The battery was taking part in "Operation Scotland 2." With no infantry support the battery and it's 70 Marines defended their perimeter in fierce hand-to-hand combat. The battle ebbed but a "stirring" counter attack led by Charlie Battery commanding officer Jim Brown, who was awarded the Silver Star for his heroic actions during the North Vietnamese assault, turned the battle being fought close in at Gun 6. Brown and eight battery Marines formed a skirmish line and charged the Communist forces driving them out of Gun 6 parapet; two battery Marines were shot by small arms during the charge.

Undaunted, they took the parapet and spun Gun on it's flat tires losing two more Marines to small arms. Direct fire ensued on the attacking Communist units while battery Marines re-grouped and held the lines.

Seven Charlie Battery Marines were killed and twenty-two were medivaced. Many wounded refused evacuation and stayed to defend the battery from counter attack. As the sun rose, 27 North Vietnamese bodies remained in the battery position. Numerous blood trails and drag marks led towards the northern ridge line, the only NVA route of escape. It was pounded throughout the later part of the attack by battery guns.

A Thought from a Marine machinegunner in 1/4 about Charlie Battery at Torch...

Every year I've put together a tribute for the men of 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, 1st Battalion Fourth Marines who gave their lives defending their fellow Marines on LZ Torch Hill 515 on June 11, 1968.

Out of 12 men in 1st squad only two made it out of that battle, Lance Corporal Moseley who was WIA, he was a rifleman and myself Corporal Gutierrez, also WIA; I was a M-60 Gun Team Leader. This M-60 Grunt just wanted to take the time to recognize the brave actions of the Marines of Charlie Battery, 1st Battalion 12th Marines, God Bless & Semper Fi.

Well Done Marines

Corporal Gutierrez - Email: USMCM60GRUNT@cs.com

Link to the story:

"The Battle of LZ Torch"

5. LZ Neville   1968Golf 3/12   Information Below

At FSB Neville NVA forces attacked and penetrated the defensive perimeter of Golf 3/12 and overran Gun 6.  Golf Battery Marines counter attacked and re-took the gun pit. 17 North Vietnamese soldiers were killed by Golf Battery personnel; Hotel 2/4 held the perimeter; their staunch defense helped hold the firebase. 34 dead NVA were found inside FSB Neville. The casualties suffered by Golf 3/12 were 3 KIA and 5 WIA. A report of the battle below as told by Al Cortez from Golf 3/12 who participated in the defense of FSB Neville

A Personal Account:

Al Cortez - Golf 3/12

In the early morning hours of February 25,1969,  FSB Neville, located northeast of the Elliott Combat Base was defended by two platoons from  Hotel Company, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, and Battery G, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines. The small FSB was protected by concertina wire, tanglefoot, listening posts, mines and sensors; it was assaulted by 200 highly trained and motivated Sappers (personal carrying satchel charge explosives) from the 246th NVA Regiment. During the time of the attack it was misty, very foggy, and visibility was almost nil.

The first indication anything was wrong came at 2400H when one of their Sappers set off a flare while the North Vietnamese were infiltrating our position. Thirty minutes later at 0030H, the gun firing H & I's (harassing & interdiction fires) and the perimeter area with the M-60's were under attack by Sappers.

The intent of Sappers is to penetrate any position they attack forcing the defenders to fight on "two fronts," one inside their perimeter and against the main force which follows the infiltration of the Sappers.  It becomes confusing, terrifying, and chaotic until the inside of the perimeter is re-secured.

After infiltrating the concertina wire on the west side of the perimeter, the attacking North Vietnamese force systematically crisscrossed the western portion of the fire base occupied by the 1st platoon and Battery G's number 6 Gun pit, tossing satchel charges, which forced the defenders into bunkers that were systematically destroyed by the attacking NVA forces.

In the glow of flares and smell of burning powder, we Marines rallied with the assistance of 60mm mortar fire and drove the attacking force from the hill. 

"We beat these Sappers, which are suppose to be the worse the North Vietnamese got," noted Gunnery Sergeant John E. Timmermeyer, Hotel-2/4.

At dawn, Captain McKnight's Hotel-2/4 Marines had lost 11 killed (KIA) and 29 wounded. When NVA Sappers penetrated Gun 6's parapet, Golf Battery Marines fought back; some battery Marines fighting hand-to-hand recovering the gun pit the enemy had occupied. 17 NVA were killed by Golf Battery. A total of 34 dead NVA were found inside the wire of FSB Neville.

Golf Battery lost three brother Marines from that unforgettable day: Corporal Jeffrey Barron, La Puente, California., Lance Corporal Thomas McGrath, Homewood, Illinois., and our Corpsmen HM3 Walter Seel. I also lost a friend, a fellow Marine from Hotel-2/4 whom I had just met.

Semper Fi,

Al Cortez - Golf 3/12

Additional remembrance...

Mike Robinson - History of LZ Neville

I have always referred to this time, through the time the 3rd Marine Division departed Vietnam as the post Khe Sanh period. I did become acclimated to the weather as much as anyone can. I also realize I had been sent to exactly the place I wanted to be at before I joined the Marines.

The war on the Demilitarized Zone had moved on from Con Thien to Khe Sanh (Webmaster's note: The war on the DMZ initially started in skirmish's on or near the DMZ in 1966 then shifted in intensity to Gio Linh in late February, 1967, escalating to the first NVA use of artillery on 20 March 1967 against the Marine 105 battery Charlie 1/12 at the Gio Linh outpost; inserted the same day of the attack was Golf 3/12, Operation Beacon Hill. about 500 meters N-NW of the firebase. The focus then changed to Con Thien in late April/early May of 1967.) and the roads end on Route 9 at the time was three miles past Vandergrift Combat Base at Ca Lu. That's where Golf Battery was at; Ca Lu was the forward deployed base for the 4th Marine Regiment. 3rd Battalion 12th Marines was the artillery support unit for the 4th Marines. Golf Battery was the direct support unit for 1st Battalion 4th Marines.

In late September Golf Battery went back into Khe Sanh valley and took up support position in the mountains to the north of the abandoned airstrip.. Hotel Battery was putting together LZ Cates a few kilometers east of Khe Sanh.

On my first chopper ride ever into that valley I remember the old base coming into view. I was shocked when I first saw it, a big, red, dirt splotch on the valley floor with bomb craters in every direction, all with water in them. The steel mat runway was still in place and six aircraft parking revampments. that was it, nothing else. As the chopper neared the base I looked out the starboard porthole and saw a little bald spot on a hill below. A thin trail wound up to it from the valley and wound away from it on the other side. I remember thinking how small it looked and it could only hold a squad or so on it. I said to myself I was glad I wasn't on that hill as we [passed it. Well,  just then the chopper pitched over to starboard and started corkscrewing down onto the hilltop. I said "oh great, that is where I am going."

We were placed on LZ Quantico for an upcoming Forth Marines operation. We fired prep fires for the operation and the 4th Marines landed near the village and humped north to the airstrip. The 3rd Marine Division Band was choppered in and all the brass from MAC V the press came too and a lot of used boots. The boots were put into formation. the brass made speeches about how we didn't need bases like Khe Sanh. That we would stay fluid and not get bogged down by fixed positions. (OH, now that last sentence. Remember it for later in this story.) The band marched up and down the runway and played music. The press documented the whole thing. Then it was over. Hotel Battery went and started LZ Russell. Golf Battery went northwest to start LZ Alpine with the 155mm howitzers following a few days later. The two 105 battery's and the three 155mm howitzers along with a bunch of grunts were on there own out there. The other 105 battery jumped over to the Laotian boarder to start LZ Argon. LZ Argon was supported by LZ Alpine and it got a bad reputation right off the bat. LZ Alpine was masked from artillery support by the over mile high peak of Tiger Mountain (Tiger Tooth). We couldn't stay in that area long. Overlapping artillery support was necessary and we were not tied off to the road head.

                           

By mid December the other batteries out there had moved back to supported areas. Golf Battery had moved to and started LZ Neville on hill 1103 eight clicks to the Northeast. On a ridgeline leading to Tiger Tooth three clicks to its south. It would be supported by Hotel Battery on LZ Russell nine clicks to the Northwest.

Now what we were doing and why? Our two batteries were in out positions from the divisions main fire and support positions. Hotel Battery was situated northwest of Camp Elliot at the Rock Pile and if It wasn't on that hilltop massive effective mortar and rocket attacks would have rained down onto Camp Elliot from that area. Those attacks would come directly from across the DMZ to the North. Hotel Battery saved lives. Now Golf Battery on LZ Neville did the same job however it was primarily protecting Vandergrift Combat Support Base. The reason it was so much farther out was Tiger Tooth Mountain. That mountain had a ridgeline that extended from it to the East called Nui Ta Pong. That ridge would be the launching point for many attacks on Vandergrift CSB. LZ Neville could get a good shot down the West side of that mountain interdicting supplies from getting to the NVA on Tiger Tooth. With an occasional recon team and do wacky do type things we could and for the most part did keep supplies in mass from reaching there launching points. Tiger Tooth always was Charlie's hill just as Dong Ha Mountain was Charlie's OP overlooking our positions. The NVA on Tiger Tooth Mountain kept a Coleman type lantern on every night till very late. It was on the West side of the hill near its top. I figured they had a card game going every night. We fired at it a few times. The light would go out for a few minuets then as soon as we secured our guns it came back on. Tiger Tooth would be best supplied from the West in Laos. A narrow valley led straight to it from the West right by LZ Argon and by the base of LZ Alpine.

LZ Neville was a miserable location. It was located on a ridgeline running east west with a cliff on its northern side and slop to its south. I'll stop short of calling it triple canopy jungle. I'll just call it short jungle. Thirty feet high or so. Very thick jungle. Thick jungle was good. Even a sapper unit can't get through it quietly. A sniper mite but that's what we had dogs for.  NOW DOGS.              

                                                                  

I have a problem with this subject of our dogs. Craton Abrums shame on you wherever you are. It was your job to let the word slip out by back channeling it to dog lovers in the USA that they were going to be killed. And what jerk did that job anyway. Or did we turn them over to the locals to do the deed. In that case they became Ours, DE Ordurves in local villes. We didn't need attack dogs. We needed good dogs and for the most part that's what we had. We needed dogs that would tell you that somebody over in that direction smells of fermented fish guts. Dogs tended to be reflections of there handlers. Upbeat handler, upbeat dog off its leash and no muzzle. He could have one of my pork slices any day. The first question I asked when the pullouts were announced was "What's going to happen to the dogs?" I got stroked again.       

                                                                          

LZ Neville was quite defendable in my opinion. It had a cliff on its northern side that the grunts didn't have to worry about for the most part. However when the enemy shows up on your doorstep you have to start working him right away. We had plenty of opportunities for a dress rehearsal on LZ Neville. The enemy showed up right where they always did.     

Mike Robinson             Golf Battery 3rd Battalion 12th Marines            Vietnam 68-69

In Addition: The following was sent adding to Mike's story...

LZ Neville was a horrible operating position. It was solid rock. To simply make it flat enough to get the howitzers on its ridge we used tons of explosives. We would use forty pound shape charges to create a dished out spot then place forty percent dynamite in that dish and place rocks back on top of the dynamite to fracture the hill. We had one accidental secondary explosion that was absolutely amazing. A coiled line shot of C-4 was brought up to be used. It was the line that mine clearing amphibious tractors use to blow a path across mine fields. It was C-4 on a rope in five pound links. We were only about a hundred feet away when the line blew. All I saw was like a gray curtain in front of me. It even had dark lines in it vertically like a pleated curtain. The only thing that saved us was a small drop off cliff that the line was behind. The blast went up. we all went flying ass over tea kettle backwards. The treeline that separated us from the explosion was striped of all foliage.                     

After the guns were brought up from LZ Alpine we had lots of trouble with downed aiming stakes from rotor wash from supply choppers. In a 360 degree war that position was bad news. For example one trail mite unhook from the rock and the gun would start hopping sideways until one tire bounced into the high angle pit. My gun went out of action from a bent trail once. My gun at one time had a five foot long lanyard and still I can remember getting bopped around sometimes.                     

I learned a little bit about geology on that hill. I was whaling away on a rock with a pick when one of the experienced guys stopped me and pointed out the stress lines in it and showed me how to pick the rock apart. You can save yourself a lot of labor by looking a rock over before you go to work on it.                     

The bottom line was tube pointing was vary difficult on that hill. Although far from perfect that was the place a battery was needed.                   

In the weeks prior to the attack we were often probed by the NVA. I have all the letters I wrote home. In my last letter home before the attack I mentioned that "It is getting weird around here. The gooks cone up to our wire almost every night and then do nothing." Our enemy was training us. We were being acclimated to there presents by them. I think we lacked imagination in dealing with them. We needed to kill the NVA probing our position by setting ambushes close to our lines in the areas they repeatedly came to.                    

A few day before the attack Bravo Battery was sent OPCON to 3/12 to LZ Alpine. Along with it an accompanying grunt company form the 3rd Marines was sent for security that was OPCON to 1/4. General Davis in doing that out flanked the NVA and by turning the end almost ninety degrees obtained the perfect angle to support LZ Neville. A couple of days after Bravo Battery was placed on LZ Alpine Golf Battery was split. Three guns went to LZ Cates. I was on one of the guns that left LZ Neville. As it has turned out thirty years after the fact. That movement was in preparation for the attack. Earlier that in the day that we went to LZ Cates the 155's that were there were sent to Vandigrift CSB. That had to be in preparation for supporting LZ Russell. also India Battery had taken up position on LZ Fuller.                     

It's obvious now that our command knew quite a bit about that attack before it happened. The supporting batteries were placed properly. There may be something that wasn't properly understood. It may possibly be something like the difference between defending a position in Elephant grass rather than jungle. It may be harder defending on a jungle hilltop. A well planed and properly executed assault is hard to stop. Especially when the enemy is given a freebie to the positions wire. The NVA were inside the danger close artillery parameters on both hills before the alert was sounded. Artillery is like a big fly swatter. It kills everything in its radius.                     

The attack on LZ Neville was the key to the NVA's mass approach to the wire at LZ Russell. It worked perfectly. Had Hotel Battery not fired in support of LZ Neville that would have stopped the enemy from getting next to the wire at LZ Russell. Remember the speeches given at Khe Sanh earlier in this story. Positions like LZ Russell became vulnerable. At the enemies convenience LZ Russell was probed for soft spots. Every detail was worked out by the enemy. That position was hit from across a border we couldn't cross to preempt that attack even though our command knew it was coming. There is the axiom that fortresses are monuments to the stupidity of man. In this world of political boundaries and gerrymandering a fortress is not such a bad idea. A hundred years before LZ Russell or even a hundred years before that a military engineer would have been dispatched to that hill. One of the first things that engineer would have said was to get rid of that wrinkle in the topography that was the trash dump. That jump off point and the assembly area they used before that wouldn't have existed. We aren't smarter than those that came before us. When faced with static area defense we were horrible. A colonial period militarist would have scoffed at us and called us morons. If it was in that time miners (combat engineers to us) would have approached the perimeter and blown access holes in it. Troops with unloaded weapons with fixed bayonets would have flooded through the holes and put the cold steel to every man jack of us. We weren't as slick as we think we were.                    

Did Agent Orange open the countryside to the extent that troop movements wouldn't be trail bound. If that's the case it worked agents us at times.                     

The attack on 25 February was probably instrumental in setting the tactics for that last year for the Third Marine Division in Vietnam. We would have to continue to attack the NVA in our tactical area right to the last day. On February 27th a recon team was mauled on LZ Argon. One PFC. Jenkens would be awarded the Meddle Of Honor posthumously for his actions on that hill. Because of that and the attacks of 25 February the assault onto LZ Argon by 1/4 on 20 March was set. That assault was to be led by two 3rd recon. teams. To be followed by a company from 1/4. Golf Batteries three 105's were to be dropped into the gun pits as soon as the hill was secured. Ammunition was dropped to the guns. Tubes were leveled and the surrounding hillsides were raked. That's basically what happened however Murphy's Law kicked in big time and a big three ring donnybrook ensued. That was a direct result of the attacks of February 25 on LZ's Russell and Neville. But that's another story for another place.                     

One other thing as artillerymen always responding to attacks. We never had to sit there finding ourselves incapable of hitting back. No others can make that statement. We responded. We always responded.

                      

I rotated out in late August and was posted to Echo Battery with the 10th. Marines at Camp Le Jeune. I went on a MED Curse with 2nd Battalion 6th Marines. Completed my enlistment in late 1970. In 1978 I did a stint in the Marine reserves at Marine Air Reserve Training Unit (MARTU) Pasadena Ca. I became a MANPADS operator. That's (man portable air defense system) I.e. Red Eye Gunner. It was great. NBGP(no big grezzy pig) to take care of. You can take one of these Little Sidewinders and shoot it (and I did) place the expended tube into the ground and urinate into it. A well thought out system. That unit was transitioning onto the Stinger system as I finished my stint in the reserves. I found overall air defense to be the most fascinating chess game in the world.                     

I have lots of stories about my time in the Marines. Vietnam was only that time in combat if you want to call it that. I really don't talk about combat per say. I like telling stories like how my buddy put Loud Mouth Lime sugarless KoolAid in my last canteen of six that I carried while in combat. How I tried and what I did to protect myself from the tiger at LZ Alpine before it managed to eat somebody and it did eat somebody in the end. Or checking in at Balikashir Turkey with a group of reservists and the officer asked how we got there. My reply was we caught a hop from NAS Andrews AFB on a Marine VIP DC-4 with an E-9 cooking and feeding us grommet food all the way over. The officer said that an order of our cancellation in the operation was sent six weeks before. He said to start catching hops back to where we came from. You see there are a lot moor stories to tell. GOD has smiled upon Me!

Mike Robinson MRHogwood@aol.com

 

4.FSB Gio Linh 1967Charlie 1/12Information Below

At FSB Gio Linh, 1100 meters south of the Demilitarized Zone Charlie 1/12 moved into position 26 February 1967 initiating Operation Highrise, the first American artillery presence near the DMZ. Relentlessly attacked by NVA mortars during the first two days, 800 enemy rounds fell in the battery position. Charlie Battery held, returning counter mortar fire; Gun 3 sustained a direct hit on its ammo bunker. Initially believed to be a 3 to 5 day "artillery raid" the Provisional Artillery Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bill Rice remained in position 62 days. Charlie Battery was the only artillery unit to remain at Gio Linh for the initial two months.

On 20 March 1967 Lieutenant General Lewis Walt, 111 MAF CG initiated "Operation Beacon Hill" in defense of Gio Linh. That same evening two North Vietnamese artillery battalions attacked FSB Gio Linh; it was the first use of artillery by North Vietnamese since the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The historic attack lasted over eight hours.

Gio Linh was two acres in size, at the time the smallest FSB in I Corps; the artillery battle raged for eight hours; Charlie 1/12 was the only artillery unit returning counter battery fire during the NVA incoming. The enemy had positioned their weapons under the 5 mile limit for Army 175's, splitting the two attacking battalions, one to the NE the other to the NW of the Marine outpost. Golf 3/12, part of the arriving BLT with Operation Beacon Hill, was unable to return counter battery fire during NVA incoming. The battery did not have time to build parapets or any type of protection for their Marines; they were able to fire when incoming would subside. With the gun positions unprotected during incoming, it would have been suicide to expose their gun crews to NVA fire. As it was,  Golf 3/12 lost one KIA to the North Vietnamese artillery. John Arnold of Golf 3/12 became the first casualty the United States suffered from North Vietnamese artillery fire in the Vietnam War.

Charlie Battery sustained two direct hits on gun's 2 and 4 but the crews took care of the wounded, repaired their howitzers and returned to the fight. Eight hours passed before permission for an AO to over-fly the DMZ was granted; finally, at 0200H 21 March 1967, the NVA 105 battalion consisting of nine howitzers was located to the NE of Gio Linh. One fire mission and 90 rounds later, Charlie Battery quickly destroyed the enemy 105's; in less than 5 minutes the battery accomplished what two NVA artillery battalions could not do in eight hours. The second enemy battalion withdrew; 1462 incoming rounds fell inside the Gio Linh perimeter that night. An ammo resupply convoy was partially destroyed 300 meters south of Gio Linh's main gate at 0330H 21 March 1967; the convoy was attempting to break through NVA infantry, which had encircled Gio Linh. 7 trucks were destroyed in the attack.

The next day it became apparent for the reason of Operation Highrise; 20 bulldozers were airlifted and dropped outside of the Gio Linh perimeter; they immediately began cutting a swath towards Con Thien. Gio Linh was the first and eastern anchor of the "McNamara Barrier." It soon was obvious the SLF infantry was not going to focus on disrupting the North Vietnamese who were now massing two regiments north and northwest of Gio Linh. The infantry surrounded the bulldozers and moved with them as they began cutting through the countryside between Gio Linh and Con Thien. It would be a costly venture in the terms of  casualties, one Marine was lost, KIA or WIA every 200 meters of the 11,000  that was cleared.

Incoming was constant in the form of mortars over the next 37 days, lines were probed, LP's ambushed, as Gio Linh remained surrounded by 8,000 Communist soldiers. On 27 April 1967 the NVA attacked Gio Linh; it was their second use of artillery in the Vietnam War. Using new tactics developed from lessons learned from the 20 March attack, North Vietnamese artillery pieces were in single, camouflaged, and fortified locations throughout the northern DMZ region and southern reaches of North Vietnam. An estimated 25 NVA artillery pieces attacked Gio Linh, all out of 105 ranges.

In spite of not being able to reach their enemy Charlie Battery manned their howitzers returning fire at what ever could be hit. Slowly, gun by gun, Marine by Marine were hit and taken out of the fight. Observers from 6/27, a 175 battery noted it had to be one of the bravest and gallant stands in the history of Marine Corps artillery. Over 2000 rounds fell that night inside the tiny FSB, its two acres were torn to pieces. The NVA made attempts to breech Gio Linh's outer perimeter by throwing blocks of C-4 into the wire, trying to simulate incoming mortars; all ground probes were repulsed.

2 KIA's and in excess of 80 WIA's are the casualty count from Charlie Battery; it is believed the estimate is not yet accurate. More than 70% of the battery were killed or wounded, over 30 were medivaced while others were treated by corpsmen and continued the fight. It took hours to get the wounded out by helicopter due to the heavy volume of incoming artillery. LZ's were rotated using heat tabs as markers; pilots would have less than one minute before NVA gunners would adjust fire on the new LZ.

12th Marine Regiment ordered Charlie Battery to displace the morning of 28 April 1967, relocating to Dong Ha; Delta 2/12 replaced the battery at Gio Linh. Charlie Battery had remained in position inside Gio Linh's two acres for 62 days, continually repulsing North Vietnamese mortars, artillery and soldiers. They were the first Marines to face the artillery onslaught from the North Vietnamese. India 3/4 held perimeter security with elements of Alpha and Delta 1/4 assisting. The battery was never recognized or remembered for their historical stand at Gio Linh...

5.Assault on Alpha North, April 1966, units A-1-11 and K-4-12

A-1-11 was about 2300 meters from K-4-12 and both were hit in an assault on the night of ?? April, 1966.  The wire at A-1-11 (Alpha North) was breached and the battery was overrun.  They did not breach our wire but tried.  The mortared us and we took a number of casualties from that, but no KIA.  We were direct firing the M109 howitzers at them.  One Lieutenant sighted a gun by laying on the barrel and giving directions to the gun crew.  I was on outpost 5 on the Alpha North side of the perimeter and in the thick of it.  We were lucky that we were on a sand pile which ate up most of the mortar shrapnel or we would have had a lot more casualties.  On Marine had a mortar round land in a foot locker beside his rack while he was sleeping.  The foot locker absorbed most of the blast, lucky guy.

Jerry West, Kilo 4/12 -  Email: record@island.net

Early in 1966 (just prior to my arrival in RVN in April) a 105 battery of 1/11 designated "Alpha North" was overrun by VC sappers. The unit was part of the Hill 327 defense structure. It was a major event for an artillery unit and should be included in your battles. The battery commander was Lieutenant Richard Seed. Lots of lessons learned came out of that tragedy.

Michael G. O'Neill - Email: moneillsc@adelphia.net

6.Operation Starlite - 1965

  An United States Marine Corps operation aimed at eliminating the 1st Viet Cong (VC) Regiment, "Operation Starlite" began near the Van Tuong Peninsula in Quang Tri Province; the year was 1965. Marine planners designed a three-pronged attack. It called for elements of the 7th Marines at Chu Lai to move south and block any VC escape north while units of the 4th Marines were helicoptered to three landing zones, named Red, White, and Blue, west and southwest of the hamlets Nam Yen and and An Cuong. These Marines would then drive the BVC northeastward toward the sea. Finally, elements of the 3d Marines would land on the beach due east of these hamlets, with amphibian and armored support, and drive west and north. Despite stiff resistance from VC forces, Starlite succeeded in pushing the insurgents to the coast. Close air support, tanks, and naval gunfire were critical to the operation's outcome. Operation Starlite came to a close on 24 August.

        Link to the story of Operation Starlite:"Operation Starlite"

  Link to Historical Archive:"Historical Journals"

7.FSB Con Then1967Whiskey 1/12    Information below

Whiskey 1-12 landed in Viet Nam  from a Navy LST in early May 1967 at Cua Viet.  We went from there to Dong Ha.  Sometime in late May we were deployed to Con Then and were there until early October.  While deployed we had 7 or 8 KAI's and several seriously wounded.

It was tough there; were were at Con Then when Bravo 1-9 was slaughtered along the DMZ.  We fired in support of that tragedy.  We suffered our fist KAI's on 6 July 1967; three of our Marines were on a ammo run (were low because of the all firing we had done) when then were killed by an incoming artillery round.

Our last KIA was on 19 September 1967;  I hope this helps.  I know the dates of all our KAI's, I do not where to start, much less  when to stop.

22 September 2007 - Forty years ago today PFC David Schouweiler, USMC from Tulsa, Oklahoma was killed at Con Then. I heard the last words he ever spoke: "Hey, I am hit." Con Then was a hell hole in September 1967; I remember David. I use this site to honor him; his life was cut short, I wish he had more time to spend on his front porch where a summer day seemed like a year. Rest in peace my friend. You are a noble warrior...

Semper Fi,

Russ Adams Whiskey 1/12

More to follow...

From the 12th Marines Historical Center...

Historical entries can be reviewed concerning records from the Battle of Chu Lai, Con Thien, Gio Linh, or other battlefields as events were recorded in combat journals by participating Marines. The monthly report of August, 1965, for the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines alone is 320 pages in length.  Pages from various "After Action Reports" were selected to illustrate the quality and enriched content of our archives.

Click here to view actual declassified documents!

8. Khe Sanh19681/12, 1/11, 1/13 Information Pending

9. Tet  1968  Information Pending

10. India Battery 3/12 - 27 July 1966

    "The Link to TALKING FISH"

12th Marines: If you know of other battles, email me. Those who fought in the above named battles/sieges please email me with your remembrances so I can publish a comprehensive story built from the eyes of those who fought these legendary battles. Please sign the guest book if you fought in any of the conflicts;  email additional info to the following address charliebattery67@wavecable.com

As a Regiment, we should all take pride in the tremendous accomplishments of our individual batteries, HQ personnel, all who were involved no matter where and what you were doing. If there was no "in the rear with the gear" there would not have been such places as Gio Linh, Con Thien, Torch, Russell, Neville, Alpha North, and so on....

The 12th Marines accomplished what others few did; most know very little about the regiment. It is our "duty" to inform those following us into harms way the legacy left to us and what we have left to them, upholding the unmatched combat record of the 12th Marines who stared down the tubes of every large artillery weapon the North Vietnamese possessed... We did not